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SUMMARY
IMMOBILISATION, RESTRICTED SPATIAL MOBILITY AND DISPLACEMENT IN VIOLENT CONFLICT \ M. RUDOLF
Putting the humanitarian–development nexus into practice, aid organisations and donors pay 
most attention to camp populations in protracted refugee situations (PRS). This Paper argues 
that synergies arise when development aid redefines and expands the area of humanitarian 
needs regarding developmental objectives and instruments rather than bolstering the main-
stream activities of humanitarian actors. Drawing on the case of Colombia, the argument of this 
Paper is threefold: First, it shows how the conditions to qualify refugees and IDPs as aid recipients 
must be extended to include forcibly immobilised persons. The Paper understands ‘forcibly im-
mobilised persons’ as individuals who are forced to stay in the same place for lack of alterna-
tives or constraints on their movement (e.g. through armed groups). Strikingly, forcibly immobi-
lised persons have so far usually been overlooked as persons in need, although they face similar 
hardships as refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). This is why this Paper proposes to 
replace the classical concept of spatial displacement with a model of displacement that includes 
both in situ immobilised persons (on the spot) and ex situ immobilised persons (immobilised after 
initial spatial movement). Second, the Paper argues that individual needs, such as the need for 
protection, rather than circumstances, should be decisive for aid eligibility. Whether a situation 
is categorised as “war”, for instance, is a highly politicised question and hence not a reliable in-
dicator—whereas a needs-based approach is. Third, the Paper draws on an in-depth analysis of 
confined communities in Colombia to show that forcibly immobilised persons—like IDPs and 
refugees—often require humanitarian and development aid, thus showing clear examples for 
how the nexus could work—as it already does in part. Overall, this Paper thus proposes a recon-
ceptualisation of the humanitarian–development nexus to ensure a more targeted reach for per-
sons in need.  
2 \ 
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The rights to property, personal security 
and human rights are severely restricted 
in confined communities
A much wider range of persons who live in zones 
that are claimed by armed actors is affected. The de-
gree to which people are affected by immobility range 
from physical violence or threats to less immediately 
life-threatening yet no less vital issues, like being  
denied access to infrastructure which affect individuals 
in different ways.
Practitioners on the ground are in-
creasingly cooperating as envisioned in 
the humanitarian–development nexus 
policy and are engaging in innovative 
projects that transcend their respective 
traditional mandates 
Obstacles to cooperation and innovations are 
rather situated at the political or institutional level. 
Aid must be designed in a longer-term 
and more holistic fashion that follows 
the needs and the people in need
Due to the protracted character of humanitarian 
emergencies, needs become overwhelming and too 
diverse for the traditional division of labour between 
humanitarian and development actors. 
A model of displacement that includes 
both in situ immobilised persons (on the 
spot) and ex situ immobilised persons 
(immobilised after initial movement in 
space) enables aid to assess and address 
needs more effectively
 
Synergies of a humanitarian–development nexus 
policy arise where development aid redefines and ex-
pands humanitarian emergency situations regarding 
objectives and instruments and where it comple-
ments activities of humanitarian actors instead of 
bolstering them. 
The degree of emergency needs to be 
assessed referring to needs and losses 
and not to movements
In contrast to voluntary migration, involuntary 
immobility is always characterised by a lack of choice. 
Lack of choice, involuntariness and the resulting lack 
of perspective are, in fact, the very characteristics that 
define and determine a humanitarian emergency 
situation. 
Main findings
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know someone at the destination get on board of one 
of the private vessels, as the realm of the central gov-
ernment ends after a few bends down the stream. 
Only sporadic hamlets on the river bank interrupt 
the otherwise dense jungle. The obviously underde-
veloped rural area is home to the guerrilla movement 
ELN (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional). The presence 
of this now largest remaining guerrilla group is indis-
putable and de facto unbroken. Visitors are reminded 
not to take pictures of or stare at supposed ‘civilians’, 
as some belong to the ELN. The persons pointed out 
go about their everyday activities such as loading 
barrels of petrol onto fast vessels and are not distin-
guishable from the civilians surrounding them. 
After passing a few hamlets consisting of wooden 
huts right on the shore, I reach Primavera, one of the 
older and larger communities on the San Juan River. 
The village has a school, which has partly been demol-
ished by the stream’s current, a muddy central square 
with broken boats, repair shops. Fishermen are re-
pairing their nets. Walking through the farms, Felix, 
a community leader of the Afro–Colombian commu-
nity in the area, tells me his life story: 
I planned to escape the local violence caused by 
armed groups by going from Choco to Medellin. But 
once I arrived in Medellin, I saw that there were too 
many murders. I then went to Cali. There were also 
murders there, but not so many. From Cali, I moved 
on to Narino where I found a job picking coca. In the 
end, I came back. Now I stay where I am [back in 
Primavera] with my youngest daughter (Primavera, 
November 2017). 
Being a coca picker meant that he ended up in an 
area that was controlled by armed groups, which 
shows his lack of alternatives, which are, in turn, due 
to economic constraints.1  
1 \  Felix specifies these economic problems: "In the city, everything costs 
something. It is hard and difficult. If you have a lot of children, they 
raise the rent. In the country [on the other hand] there is always 
something”. Still, two other children now go to school in Medellin.
In contrast to other poorer districts of Cali in 
western Colombia, Potrero Grande owns a school, a 
police station, a community centre and a park. Loitering 
men watch over invisible borders as scouts at strate-
gic points. Maria is barely 40 years old and the mother 
of six children. The family lives in a narrow terraced 
house with two floors. In 2000, Maria and her four 
eldest children were expelled from a village in Cauca, 
about 150 km away. To this day, there is no chance of 
returning: “We can't go back because the guerrillas 
grow coca [there]”. After escaping, the family first set-
tled in an illegally built slum in Cali where criminality 
was high, landslides common, and where the children 
could not move freely, “….otherwise they would have 
killed them”. In comparison, the situation in Potrero 
is better, as Maria reports
We are fine here. But on the other hand, there is also 
a lot of violence here. [Yet] my children don't bother 
anyone. We are silent because of the absence of the 
state. You get used to it—even the children. We try to 
avoid problems and not be treated like gallinas 
[chickens]. We don't talk to the police [about what 
happens]. 
Maria’s situation is representative of that of the 
residents of Potrero Grande who stand between the 
fronts of gangs, criminals, guerrillas, and the police. 
Their vulnerability is reinforced by the experience 
that no one is called to account for the violence they 
spread. Potrero was meant to become a showcase urban 
project, yet at the time of writing, nearly all organisa-
tions have left, apart from the Red Cross whose staff 
whenever they enter the suburb, are to wear their 
bright coloured vests just like in a war zone. The pub-
lic transport system in the suburb and the centre are 
separated: Pick up vans operate in the outskirts, taxis 
in the centre. Strangers hardly ever make it to Potrero. 
Even though it is a suburb, the neighbourhood is very 
much cut off from the centre. Its residents are con-
fined within their area by invisible borders. 
Driving up the San Juan River, in Choco province, 
I get a similar impression: Transport is private, irreg-
ular and only possible via water. Boats leave from the 
main bridge close to the central cathedral of the local 
capital Istmina. The pier is public, but only those who 
Introduction: Forcibly immobilised persons— 
Out of sight, out of mind?
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The examples illustrate how economic and secu-
rity concerns, humanitarian and development issues 
overlap. Like in Primavera, armed groups are mostly 
found in regions that are relatively underdeveloped—
namely Choco, Guajira, Nariño, Meta, Guaviare. Besides 
Potrero, humanitarian and development problems 
also coincide in urban centres like Cucuta, Bogota, 
Medellin, Cali, Bueanaventura or Tumaco. The cases, 
thus, point to a more general question: In the face of 
overlaps in regard to emergency needs in armed con-
flicts, how can development aid and humanitarian 
aid complement each other in assisting affected per-
sons? This Paper offers insights into trapped or con-
fined communities in Colombia3 , which, as I argue, 
find themselves in largely unnoticed emergencies  
despite significant needs for humanitarian aid—
while at the same representing a prime example of 
how the humanitarian–development nexus could 
function when both fields of aid are combined. 
As I will show in the following, the situation 
within confined communities, in general, illustrates 
significant needs for humanitarian and development 
aid, which are in many ways similar to the needs of 
populations that live in conditions conventionally 
categorised as displacement crises (i.e. refugees and 
IDPs).4  After the Introduction, I will present the 
methodology used for this research. I will then explain 
why it makes sense to include forcibly immobilised 
persons in the category of displaced persons. Being 
 
3 \  Trapped communities is the terminology used in most literature, 
while confined communities (communidades confinadas) is used in 
Colombia. Due to the fact that the causes, forms and courses of their 
situation largely resembles the situation of displaced persons this 
group is also referred to as persons that are displaced in place (Magar-
amombe, 2010). To avoid switching terms the text will follow the  
Colombian usage hereafter, unless paraphrasing articles or specifically 
making a point about similarities to displaced persons.
4 \  I define forced displacement and expulsion as involuntary migratory 
movements from the place of origin to a destination.  I define displaced 
persons as all persons who flee from their country or region of origin 
or habitual residence, regardless of their ascribed status (asylum seeker, 
refugee, IDP, stateless person, migrant, irregular, illegal, person of con-
cern, etc.) and who are not able to return for reasons of persecution, 
armed conflict, civil unrest, or natural or man-made catastrophes.  
The term refugee is used to refer to displaced persons who are entitled 
to refugee protection - an internationally agreed legal status resulting 
from fleeing across an international border. The term internally dis-
placed persons (IDPs), on the other hand, narrows down the group of 
displaced persons who have not fled across national borders (see BICC 
Working Definitions: Protected rather than protracted -Strengthening 
refugees and peace project,  unpublished, 2016). .
His story mirrors the situation of the majority of 
those who live in the area. Many declare that they see 
no possibility to escape the situation: "Where should 
we go? What should we do there? It is already difficult 
enough to make ends meet here", explains a family of 
small farmers in one of the tiny villages along the river 
(San Juan River, November 2017). In a group discus-
sion with villagers of another hamlet along the San 
Juan River, they complain that they feel abandoned 
by the state: “No help comes here. No matter what 
happens - [we get nothing here]. They [the authorities] 
are in Istmina. Only yesterday there was a raid. But 
they won't get out [of the city]”. 
Immobilisation as an emergency
Though Primavera and Potrero Grande differ in 
many regards—a rural vs an urban setting, a peripheral 
vs central province, home to the biggest remaining 
guerrilla group vs an economic hub with a declining 
homicide rate, these cases feature similar vulnerabilities 
and needs of people in armed conflict. Humanitarian 
and development actors regard both examples as 
emergency cases (Internal Displacement Monitoring 
Centre [IDMC], 2019; Norwegian Refugee Council, 
2018; UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs [OCHA], 2019b, 2019a; Refugees International, 
2006; United Nations, 2018). Yet both receive little atten-
tion (and funds)2  from politicians or donors on the 
national or international level. When it was founded, 
the suburb Potrero in urban Cali was a development 
project, meant to be a model of social integration for 
vulnerable people in a city that has seen a declining but 
still high rate of homicides (Noti5, 2019). This example 
from a rural red (high-risk) zone in the peripheral Choco 
region on the Pacific coast, which is often regarded as 
the most neglected part of Colombia (Small Arms 
Survey [SAS], 2016), shows how underdeveloped regions 
often offer ideal conditions for armed groups and, 
hence, feature a high number of humanitarian 
emergencies. 
2 \  OCHA indicated that the combination of a lack of funds and an in-
creased number of persons in need was “… deteriorating the response 
capacity for emergency situations in Colombia“ (OCHA, 2019b, p. 30).
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aware of the inherent contradiction when speaking 
about an immobilised displaced person in situ—that 
is before or without displacement, I analyse the  
empirical reality in Colombia to illustrate my point.  
I argue that the humanitarian and development in-
struments devised to meet the needs of refugees or 
IDPs also suit immobilised persons. A differentiated 
analysis of degrees of immobilisation and coercion 
indicates that eligibility for aid should rather be  
determined by the needs of individual recipients than 
the question of whether a person has been forced to 
flee or not. Examining the restrictions and lack of 
protection of confined communities, I propose to 
shift the indicators for aid needs instead of revising 
reliable instruments and strategies. The needs in 
question are twofold: Protection from human rights 
violations and assistance for victims of human rights 
violations. Consequently, I conclude that the assistance 
needs in confined communities demonstrate the rel-
evance and benefits of the humanitarian–development 
nexus, with development aid working both preven-
tively and on a longer-term basis. 
Research methodology
This Paper is based on extensive anthropological 
fieldwork carried out in Colombia (see Map 1). Taking 
a qualitative mixed-methods approach, a team, 
consisting of the author and five local assistants, 
conducted qualitative narrative interviews, combined 
with on-the-spot observations, focus group discus-
sions and workshops with a choice of relevant stake-
holders. Research addressed displaced persons, mem-
bers of the host communities, experts, international 
humanitarian and development actors, local civil 
society organisations and political organisations. The 
samples of displaced persons and the host community 
took diversity, gender, age, national and ethnic identi-
ties as well as respective locally important markers 
into account.  
Most of the observations were made and inter-
views were conducted in rural and urban areas and/
or demobilisation camps (zonas veredales), with vic-
tims, displaced persons, hosts and former combatants 
(see Map 1). The research strove for in-depth and 
longitudinal research applying social-anthropological 
methods. It was carried out in 2017 and 2018.5  In  
dialogue with local experts, locations and target groups 
were continuously refined. The approach followed a 
systematic serendipity routine to collect and process 
additional information.6  This form of participative 
and dialogical research, thus, provides representative 
ideal typical cases without claiming statistical 
representativeness.
5 \  The biggest part of cases presented in this Paper is based on observations 
from May to June respectively October to December 2017. Special 
thanks go to the assistants Rodrigo Alejandro Paredes, Leidy Karina 
Sabogal Ospina, Lina Marcela Gomez Nunez, Javier Chiran and Robeiro 
Mesa Camayo who independently carried out complementary research 
in Cartagena, Soacha, Cali and partly in the respective hinterlands 
from 2017 until 2018.
6 \  To systematically include serendipity into our research methods 
meant to allow for coincidences not only to happen but to follow the 
opportunities opened by them routinely. In contrast to random sample 
methods, this means that we talked to the neighbours that were present 
next to the house selected by random choice (flipping pen method, 
random number) instead of the targeted house as the method would 
strictly demand.
Map 1   
Research sites in Colombia
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This Paper proposes a re-conceptualisation of the 
humanitarian–development nexus. It argues that 
valuable synergies between both fields of aid can be 
achieved on a wider scale than presently acknowl-
edged. It thus offers concrete conceptual steps towards 
further operationalising the nexus, which go beyond 
the abstract notion that the 
…[humanitarian–development] nexus represents an 
opportunity to engage with […] root causes … [recog-
nising] that humanitarian crises can be caused and/
or heightened by poor development policies and a lack 
of inclusive and appropriate development investment, 
(Fanning & Fullwood-Thomas, 2019, p. 6).  
Synergies or contradictions? 
The humanitarian–development nexus policy 
aims to find synergies between development and  
humanitarian actors. In principle, numerous human-
itarian and development organisations advocate the 
idea that there are potential synergies in jointly and 
holistically addressing emergency needs (Fanning & 
Fullwood-Thomas, 2019; International Committee of 
the Red Cross [ICRC], 2018). They argue that needs  
become overwhelming and too diverse for the tradi-
tional division of labour between humanitarian and 
development actors, due to the protraction of emer-
gencies.7  NGOs like Oxfam pledge to see this nexus as 
a chance to overcome the shortcoming of humanitarian 
aid in only addressing “symptoms of underlying  









7 \ Referring to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and 
the Council of the European Union, ICRC points at the increasing 
number of displaced people to illustrate the necessity of cooperation: 
“With more than 68.5 million people worldwide forcibly displaced by 
conflict, violence, or human rights violations, and 130 million reliant 
on humanitarian assistance, the humanitarian system requires addi-
tional support to address needs of such magnitude and diversity” 
(ICRC, 2018, p. 3). 
(Fanning & Fullwood-Thomas, 2019, p. 6). The Interna 
tional Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) also argues 
that development aid is needed to enlarge and com 
plement humanitarian aid (ICRC, 2018).8 
Development actors like the World Bank promote the 
humanitarian–development nexus concept as an ap-
proach without alternatives as they predict a growing 
role of conflict as the major obstacle to development.9 
Both converge in the notion that development aid 
encompasses humanitarian aid, yet that both address 
the same basic needs when responding to emergencies. 
Other voices, such as Medecins Sans Frontieres 
(MSF) see more fundamental reasons why it remains 
hard to implement the nexus policy so far and why it 
might be a better idea to not cooperate with develop-
ment organisations. The organisation voiced its oppo-
sition when it pulled out of the World Humanitarian 
Summit platform with a letter in which it warned 
against the risk of an “…incorporation of humanitarian 
assistance into a broader development and resilience 
agenda” (MSF, 2016). This argument is based on the 
notion that it might be impossible to remain neutral 
when cooperating too closely with states.10  Those 
critics who see irreconcilable differences focus on the 
fact that development aid is often used as an exten-
sion of foreign policy (MSF, 2016.), although they ac-
knowledge that humanitarian aid is not immune to 
suffering the same fate (MSF, 2016). To underline that 
humanitarian aid is not immune to this risk makes 
sense against the backdrop that there is no unani-
mous practice of humanitarian aid in the first place:  
 
 
8 \  ICRC nevertheless argues that: “Humanitarian aid must be provided 
solely on the basis of the needs of the affected population and fall 
beyond the scope of political, strategic, military, or economic pressures, 
in line with the 2007 European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid” 
(ICRC, 2018, p. 7).
9 \  The World Bank points out that conflict has a crucial impact on devel-
opment: “Fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV) is a critical development 
challenge that threatens efforts to end extreme poverty, affecting both 
low- and middle-income countries. By 2030, FCV countries will be 
home to 46% of the world’s extreme poor. Conflicts also drive 80% of all 
humanitarian needs and reduce gross domestic product (GDP) growth 
by two percentage points per year, on average” (World Bank Group, 2019).
10 \  Such critical voices point out that the (double or triple) nexus bears 
the risk of downplaying the importance of protection in cooperating 
with states unwilling to grant human rights and to be drawn into  
politics instead (Fanning & Fullwood-Thomas, 2019, pp. 34–37).
Conceptualising a needs-based nexus policy
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There are numerous private, non-government, gov-
ernment and inter-government bodies that are as 
diverse in their interpretation of humanitarian 
(respectively development) ideals as the backgrounds 
they come from.11  
Anderson (1999) observed that aid can never be 
completely neutral and thereby underlined that it is 
always a part of politics. The reservations of MSF and 
Anderson indicate that humanitarian and develop-
ment aid need to be aware of the political context 
they are acting in. In obvious cases, a state is actively 
displacing persons and violating human rights. On a 
much more subtle level, as I will argue in the follow-
ing, this also already affects the politics and policies 
of categorising and designating aid to regions and 
beneficiaries. These politics inevitably require actors 
to position themselves. According to the humanitarian 
principles “…aid should minimize and relieve the  
suffering of people affected by crises, save lives, main-
tain human dignity and increase community resil-
ience for future disasters, wherever it is needed”  
(Fanning & Fullwood-Thomas, 2019, p. 8). 
Normative and descriptive categories
Although these principles are straightforward, 
the question when to act and when not to engage is a 
prominent debate in development and humanitarian 
aid. This is especially true as previously neatly sepa-
rated situations such as war and peace increasingly 
overlap in more and more protracted or cyclical con-





11 \  This Paper focuses on a political–practitioners–humanitarian debate. 
Even though it mentions peace, this debate is more about the double 
(humanitarian–development) than the triple (–peace) nexus. It is 
worth noting that there is another, more academic, debate in which 
the relation of humanitarianism with peace and military interventions 
is discussed. As regards the fact that most military interventions of 
the Western world since the end of the Cold War have been labelled 
humanitarian interventions, it seems legitimate to ask whether the 
real divide is less between humanitarian and development aid but 
rather between humanitarian aid and humanitarian government 
(Agier, 2010, 2011; Nyers, 2013; Verdirame, Harrell-Bond, Barbara, & 
Sachs, 2005) or between humanitarian aid and peacebuilding (Calhoun, 
2010; Meininghaus, 2016; Schetter & Prinz, 2019; Walters, 2010).
of labelling emergencies, on categorising crises or 
deciding on beneficiaries—although these labels are 
decisive for aid organisations to identify who is eligible 
for aid and who is not (Rudolf, 2019b). Humanitarian 
and development aid that invoke humanitarian prin-
ciples to justify their mission often trigger exclusive 
practices in reifying generalised categories rather 
than dismantling them. Wrong conceptualisations  
might obstruct the efficiency of aid.12  This Paper illus-
trates this point in arguing that the suffering of people 
who live in confined communities is systematically 
overlooked. 
Why have confined communities so far been 
largely neglected as persons in need? Among the dis-
placed, refugees are the group that are internationally 
most visible, and who, from a legal perspective, have 
arguably the strongest rights: “Being a refugee, in 
other words, means being a person who deserves  
protection and being a person who can, in practical 
terms, be guaranteed the substitute or surrogate pro-
tection of the international community” (Hathaway, 
2007, p. 353). Putting such rights into practice, UNHCR 
is the most well-funded and largest organisation  
active in displacement crises. They extended their  
mandate to also provide protection and assistance for 
IDPs, stateless persons and so-called people of con-





12 \  Recent articles also highlight the pitfalls of commissioned academic 
research that, from the beginning, is meant to comply with the de-
mand to be policy relevant (Guevara & Kostic, 2017; Kauppi, 2014). A 
considerable part of research aims at guiding policy, but ends up being 
policy-guided. Bakewell, thus, explicitly asks to do “Research Beyond 
the Categories” stressing “The Importance of Policy Irrelevant Research” 
and suggests “…that this reliance of academic researchers on policy 
categories tends to obscure and render invisible some population 
groups, causal relationships, and questions that are methodologically 
difficult to capture” (2008, p. 433).
13 \  This extension has been criticised as turning UNHCR into the world’s 
largest welfare organisation (Hathaway, 2007, p. 357). In countries like 
Colombia, many functions are actually taken over by OCHA, which is 
the coordinating body for humanitarian affairs. In line with most of 
the literature, I will refer mostly to UNHCR in the conceptual part of 
the Paper, but to OCHA when talking about statistics and reports on 
Colombia.
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been included in their mandate. The UNHCR defini-
tion of persons who are under threat and entitled to 
aid clearly regards spatial movement as the principal 
condition for a person to qualify as an aid recipient.14 
In addition to this legal dimension, the unparal-
leled role of UNHCR in this field compounds this  
focus on refugee situations in its allocation of funds, 
and UNHCR holds a vested interest in a near-monopoly 
on emergency relief for refugees. UNHCR’s framing is 
often mirrored by other NGOs. At the same time, it 
holds significant power in shaping wider international 
aid policy. UNHCR politically negotiates the refugee 
convention with signatories (and non-signatories) 
while also managing and coordinating aid for mil-
lions of persons under its mandate. UNHCR thus 
strongly influences the entire process of implement-
ing and executing aid programmes for displaced  
persons. To complement and not just bolster humani-
tarian work, development aid actors, hence, have the 
two tasks of positioning themselves towards UNHCR’s 
politics and policies and to identify their own role 
regarding emergency needs in situations of forced 
displacement. 
In sum, contrary to governments or organisa-
tions like UNHCR (incl. subordinated actors) that 
have continuously correlated needs of persons affected 
by displacement with spatial movement, forced  
displacement is not homogenous, and non-move-
ment represents an important category to consider.  
 
14 \  According to UNHCR’s definition, refugees are individuals recognised 
under the 1951 Refugee Convention relating to the status of refugees, 
its 1967 Protocol, the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention 
Governing the specific Aspects of refugee Problems in Africa, those 
recognised in accordance with the UNHCR statute, individuals granted 
complementary forms of protection, (‘Complementary protection’  
refers to protection provided under national, regional or international 
law to persons who do not qualify for protection under refugee law 
instruments but are in need of international protection because they 
are at risk of serious harm) and those enjoying temporary protection. 
(‘Temporary protection’ refers to arrangements developed to offer pro-
tection of a temporary nature, either until the situation in the country 
of origin improves and allows for a safe and dignified return or until 
individual refugee or complementary protection status determination 
can be carried out.) The refugee population also includes persons in 
refugee-like situations. (This term is descriptive in nature. It includes 
groups of persons who are outside their country or territory of origin 
and who face protection risks similar to refugees but for whom refugee 
status has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained.)
As I will show next, forced immobility can de facto 
also represent a form of forced displacement, and the 
causes and impacts of both, for instance through 
armed conflict and violation of human dignity, are 
often similar—whether or not individuals cross an 
international border or not even the boundaries of a 
municipality. For the time being, it is up to actors 
other than UNHCR to support confined communities 
and other persons with similar needs that are excluded 
from aid due to their immobility.15 
15 \  “The increasingly protracted and recurrent nature of crises means 
that there is a greater range of overlapping and compounding needs 
and rising uncertainty within contexts. … A more joined-up approach 
would offer opportunities to respond more effectively and holistically 
to people’s needs. To reflect this understanding, the concept of a 
‘humanitarian-development nexus’, or a ‘humanitarian-development- 
peace nexus’ has developed”. (Fanning & Fullwood-Thomas, 2019, p. 6). 
In other words: Longer-term development aid should ideally comple-
ment short-term humanitarian relief in longer, more volatile and multi-
faceted emergencies. 
UNHCR’s number are not consistent, but within this range (see http://
www.unhcr.org/sy/internally-displaced-people; http://www.unhcr.
org/syria-emergency.html; http://www.unhcr.org/sy/summary-of-un-
hcr-syria-idp-operations). IDMC counts 6.8 million (http://www.inter-
nal-displacement.org/countries/syria).
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52 per cent. Moreover, an increase in investment—
referred to as the Colombian miracle—has almost  
tripled the per capita income since 2000. It rose from 
US $5,805 to US $14,810, which meant that 4.6 million 
people crossed the poverty line between 2010 and 2016 
(Gomez Buendia, 2018). 
However, several indicators qualify the positive 
picture. As a signatory of the Peace Treaty, the opposi-
tional FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de  
Colombia) was only one of several guerrilla groups. 
Other guerrillas, of which the ELN (Ejército de Liber- 
ación Nacional) is the best known, are still active. 
Since the Peace Treaty was signed and the FARC was 
demobilised, dozens of its former members have been 
killed, and the number of dissidents has meanwhile 
increased noticeably. Also, since 2016, around 400 
community leaders and human rights defenders 
have been systematically killed. Very few of these  
cases have been solved (Diaz & Jimenez, 2018; Semana, 
2019b). Political murders are still rampant. Various 
studies, therefore, question the official statistics on 
violence. They argue that the dramatic decline is due 
in part to a combination of changes in data collection17 
and the transformation of more visible forms of vio-
lence into less visible and less detectable methods 
such as blackmail or threats (Gomez Buendia, 2018).18 
Other developments are at least ambivalent. The 
visibility of criminal organisations has declined. Para-
militaries no longer appear officially and therefore no 
longer claim parastatal legitimacy. Yet, the territorial 
spread and control of transport corridors by non-state 
armed groups has increased. Various organised 
armed groups have entered areas that opened up due 
 
17 \  To assess the level of everyday exposure to violence, the methodology 
behind the statistics needs to be taken into account. In parallel to  
the general fall of abductions under the regime of President Uribe in 
Colombia, the number of threats rose. This was due to the changed 
practice of the police to register an abduction that lasted less than 
48h—for instance to withdraw money from an ATM repeatedly (known 
as the millionaires’ ride)—as a threat instead of an abduction. Some 
analysts, therefore, estimate that the number of threats in general 
quadrupled during the all-time low of abductions: “Whereas the offi-
cial figures show a total of 9,382 kidnapping victims during Uribe’s 
eight years in office, the commission found 15,537—meaning that nearly 
forty percent of victims were not included in the official figures. ... 
While the police reported 282 kidnappings in 2010, the National Center 
for Historic Memory counted 1,252” (Gurney, 2015).
18 \  This view was expressed in various interviews with experts and  
actors in 2017, both in urban and rural zones.
A close analysis of daily life within confined com-
munities in Colombia illustrates how their needs for 
humanitarian and development aid can, in fact, be 
considerable. Even though these territories are not 
characterised as areas of violent conflict or war and 
their populations do not fit conventionally acknowl-
edged displacement categories, they experience persis-
tent violence. Although the major conflict in Colombia, 
Latin America’s longest-lasting civil war, ended with 
a Peace Treaty in 2016, peace has not reached the entire 
territory of Colombia.
Colombia’s prospects for peace, which now appear 
to have been achieved, long seemed slim. Since 1964, 
the conflict had once produced the world’s highest 
number of hostages—with a peak of 3,572 in 2000 
(Gurney, 2015). It had the highest international average 
of murders per 100,000 inhabitants between 1985 and 
2005 (Roser & Ritchie, 2019) and internally displaced 
persons—in 2017, between 6.5 (IDMC, 2018) and 7.7 mil-
lion (UNHCR, 2015). The spread of drug cartels and 
other armed groups (see below), the number of refu-
gees in neighbouring countries and the number of in-
ternally displaced persons is exceeding the respective 
Syrian numbers to-date (6.2–6.8 million, depending 
on the source16).
When a peace treaty was adopted in 2016, the 
country’s negative image abroad improved (Ioris & 
Ioris, 2018; Mendes, Siman, & Fernandez, 2019). Once 
perceived as a centre of criminal networks and a cradle 
of excessive violence, Colombia now appeared as a 
source of stability in the region (Maldonado, 2017). 
But neither the undifferentiated portrayal as an  
exclusive civil war country or the image of a country 
in peace nor the policies that are based on such gen-
eralisations did justice to Colombia’s complex reality. 
It is true, the Peace Treaty led to an improvement in 
important indicators: The number of murders in 2017 
was the lowest in 42 years; kidnappings declined by 
20 per cent in 2000; threats fell by 32 per cent nation-
wide; extortion fell by 43 per cent and terrorism by 
 
 
16 \  UNHCR’s number are not consistent, but within this range (see 
http://www.unhcr.org/sy/internally-displaced-people; http://www.
unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html; http://www.unhcr.org/sy/summa-
ry-of-unhcr-syria-idp-operations). IDMC counts 6.8 million (http://
www.internal-displacement.org/countries/syria).
Colombia: Assessing an ambivalent peace
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to the withdrawal of the FARC and the reluctance of 
the Colombian Army to replace their control (Burbano, 
2018; Rojas Hernandez, 2018). The lack of effective state 
structures in isolated areas on the Pacific coast and 
in border regions led to a significant increase in  
cocaine production and the territorial spread of crim-
inal organisations (Fundacion Ideas para la Paz, 2018; 
Semana, 2018). Despite the Peace Treaty, there are still 
areas where the Colombian state does not manage to 
enforce its power.19  Taking together, these facts suggest 
a qualitative and spatial shift of extra-legal forms of 
violence that continue to exist outside the state  
monopoly of violence after the Peace Treaty between 
the government and the FARC in Havana in 2016. 
Forced displacement after the Peace 
Treaty
Even if generalisations cannot do justice to 
Colombia’s diversity, some historical commonalities 
must be taken into account:20  The practice of violent 
appropriation and expulsion through colonisation 
has a centuries-old history.21  Historical practice has 
led to a dynamic of mutually reinforcing deterrence 
strategies of violence, which persist and orientate the 
behaviours or actors up to this day. This can be seen 
in mano dura politics on the political level and gallina 
ideology on a personal level.22  Times of peace in  
Colombia have been interruptions rather than settle-
ments of conflicts. The spectrum of peace has been 
ranging from ceasefires between the conflicting  
parties (at best) to the winner’s regime of terror (at 
worst)—perpetrators were virtually never held to 
account.
19 \  The fact that senior leaders have recently joined dissident groups 
does not yet put the process as a whole into question but indicates 
that the success is limited and that armed groups are still very much 
active (Janetsky, 2019; Semana, 2019a).
20 \  The current conflict can be traced back to the Bogotazo in the 1940s 
or even be seen as a continuous civil war dating back to the 19th cen-
tury (Hörtner, 2006; Jenss, 2016; König, 2008).
21 \  A study of Vergara-Figueroa (2017) scrutinises the continuous resist-
ance of Afro–Colombians against the historical practice of expulsion.
22 \  ‘Mano dura’ [hard hand] refers to politics of the iron fist comparable 
to the US law and order narrative. It is most known for the case of El 
Salvador after 2003 (D’Aubuisson, 2017; Does, 2013; Hume, 2007). ‘Gallina’ 
[chicken], cf. quote above, refers to a mix of being a coward and an easy 
target (cf. footnote 39 on ‘dar papaya’).
The Peace Treaty nevertheless addresses the last 
point in particular. The Jurisdiccion Especial para la 
Paz (JEP), a Special Jurisdiction for Peace, is set out to 
hold perpetrators from the military, paramilitary and 
guerilla to account. So far, it has been effective (Semana, 
2019d), but its long-term success remains to be seen. 
As the causes of forced displacement such as dispos-
session, poverty, exposure to violence and missing 
prosecution are only partially addressed,23  it would 
be inappropriate to regard the Treaty as sufficient for 
lasting solutions, reintegration and a sustained re-
duction in the number of victims.24  The persistently 
high number of 5.1 million people in need in humani-
tarian situations (OCHA, 2019b, p. 2) indicates that 
large parts of the population require protection and 
aid—just as before the agreement. Two phenomena 
make clear that the extent of the need is even greater 
than officially announced figures suggest: Urban dis-
placement and the immobilisation of groups. 
According to recent numbers, it is evident that 
the Peace Treaty did not result in less displacement 
or violence. Since 2017, numbers have risen again 
(Cobb, 2019) and registered displaced persons increased 
by 66 per cent (OCHA, 2019b). The number of commu-
nity leaders killed doubled in 2018 compared to 2016/17 
(Valenzuela, 2019). Figure 1 shows the number of per-
sons officially registered as confined persons by the 
government agency UARIV (Unidad para la Atencion 
y la Reparacion Integral a las Victimas). Yet, these 
numbers are to be taken with a grain of salt. OCHA, 
for example, counts nearly four million people in  
situations characterised by “…movement limitations 
during certain hours and in specific areas, restrictions 
on access to goods and services as well as livelihoods 
and access to fundamental rights” (OCHA, 2019b, p. 15).
23 \  In retrospect, negotiators and guarantors gave too little attention to 
historical continuity and the actual level of implementation while the 
belief in political declarations of intent was too strong. As a result, ex-
pectations of the agreement as a whole were too high (Davalos, Morales, 
Holmes & Davalos, 2018; Mendes, Siman & Fernandez, 2019).
24 \  The official figure in September 2019 was 8,874,110 victims (Alsema, 
2018; RUV, 2019).
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Politics of differentiating humanitarian 
needs
While immobilisation as such had already existed, 
the visibility and structure of those cases changed 
when the government redefined groups that claimed 
to have political motives as criminal armed gangs 
(bandas criminales—bacrim groups). With the end of 
demilitarised parastatal enclaves (under paramilitary 
or guerrilla rule), the official demobilisation of the 
paramilitary in 2006 and the Peace Treaty in 2016,  
politics no longer followed up the issue of immobi-
lised communities. Humanitarian matters are always 
a political issue. To acknowledge a phenomenon like 
areas outside the reach of government control or the 
fact that there is a certain number of displaced per-
sons always means to establish a fact and to admit 
In the first semester (January–June) of 2019, the 
Defensoría del Pueblo registered 11,349 persons con-
fined in 54 communities in Choco. According to gov-
ernment sources, the most severely affected commu-
nities are exclusively ethnic minority communities 
(Defensoria del Pueblo, 2019). This shows the different 
degrees of immobilisation: Those communities that 
are virtually completely cut off by armed groups and 
those whose access is restricted due to the presence 
of such groups. It also shows that there is a need to 
differentiate and disaggregate humanitarian needs 
from the bottom up.
Figure 1 
Confined persons
©BICC based on OCHA, 2019b, p. 15; RUV, 2019.
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recognised as a political partner. Under President 
Uribe (2002–2010), the FARC were declared terrorists 
with whom one could not negotiate, while paramili-
taries, according to official accounts, were consistently 
demobilised and dissolved. Under President Santos 
(2010–2018), the FARC were politically integrated, and 
partial political successes were achieved in talks with 
the ELN as representatives of certain areas and politi-
cal demands (talks with experts 2017, cf. Bello Montes, 
2008; Bouvier, 2009; Historica, 2015; Hörtner, 2006; 
Sanchez Gomez, Salinas Abdala, Perez Trujillo, & Centro 
Nacional de Memoria Historica, 2015; Weiskopf et al., 
2016). 
The line of differentiation between political and 
criminal groups remains thin though. Groups, such 
as the EPL (Ejercito Popular de Liberacion), guerrilla27  
and AGC (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia a.k.a. 
Clan del Golfo a.k.a. Urabenos), paramilitaries that 
once negotiated with the government, were denied 
political legitimacy under the government of Uribe. 
Nowadays, political demands of such guerrilla and 
paramilitary groups are predominantly tactical 
(various expert interviews 2017–2018).28  Labelling 
these groups and the operations against them as 
non-political, however, does not mean that the civilian 
population has less to worry about. On the contrary: 
Although the situation is warlike, people living in 
these areas are denied protection and help by the 
state.29  
27 \  The EPL used to be a nationwide guerrilla with political demands be-
fore (mostly) demobilising in 1991 to become a political party. After the 
political integration of the FARC in 2016, the competing EPL resurged 
and expanded their control over the Catatumbo area and into new 
parts of the country.
28 \  The relation between the FARC dissidents and criminal gangs (bandas 
criminiales–bacrim) is not clear yet (Posada, 2018; Chaparro, 2019).
29 \  This phenomenon is not limited to Colombia. Similar examples can 
be found in North Kivu in DR Congo or in Tanzania-Burundi (Rudolf, 
forthcoming).
what could be seen as government failure.25  The official 
interpretation of such cases is the result of political 
disputes that reveal claims of sovereignty. 
In such a political climate, the challenge for  
humanitarian aid is to position itself and uphold its 
own interpretation of a situation. Even in countries 
where governments are seen as cooperative partners, 
such as Colombia, these questions are politically 
highly sensitive.26  A problem is that the labels used 
for instance for armed groups—whether these are 
“terrorists”, “gangs” or other—have changed signifi-
cantly over the past decades and are decisive for 
whether or not a situation is considered one of war or 
violent conflict—hence whether it is a humanitarian 
emergency or not. The question of how a particular 
conflict or group is labelled and evaluated—and 
whether a situation is categorised as a humanitarian 
emergency or displacement crisis—is all the more 
politically explosive as the sovereign tasks of the 
state are called into question, such as the monopoly 
on the use of force or the protection of the population 
or private property. 
Colombia's recent history, for example, shows 
how strongly the political context determines the 
assessment of the causes of forced displacement and 
how this assessment, in turn, influences the situa-
tion itself. In the Caguan Process under President 
Pastrana (1998–2002), the FARC were granted a larger 
self-governing territory, and the group itself was 
  
25 \  The reasons why figures are adjusted are manifold, but mostly con-
nected with the fact that the underlying serious shortcomings and 
irregularities are to be concealed. Grievances such as armed conflicts, 
human rights violations, discrimination, land theft and crime are 
always a sign of a lack of state authority respectively poor governance. 
The author personally observed a case in Goma, DR Congo in 2014 that 
makes this particularly evident: According to the non-refoulement 
principle, refugees may only return voluntarily and in safety—when 
the conditions for a return have been met. In a blatant reversal of this 
principle, the government in Goma closed camps and forced inhabitants 
to return. This was meant to prove peace and security in the areas of 
destination (which remained outside government control), arguing 
that any return can only be voluntary and safe (see below).
26 \  The demand to be aware of difficulties in “balancing the development 
of good relationships with governments and obligations to raise vulner-
able people’s rights in the face of inequality, discrimination and abuses” 
(Fanning & Fullwood-Thomas, 2019, p. 41) is therefore given for human-
itarian actors in all context (as I argue, this also includes dealing with 
UNHCR and other international organisations)—not only so-called 
rogue states.
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The military, in the Catatumbo area, for example, 
now uses a tactic of search and destroy, in which the 
soldiers mostly fly in with helicopters, carry out their 
mission and withdraw again.30  The civilian population  
flees from these military actions into the surrounding 
mountains and returns after the fighting has subsided 
(interviews, video footage, Cucuta October 2017). The 
Catatumbo area is otherwise inaccessible in large 
parts. Communities living there are only occasionally 
supported by NGOs, the church and various interna-
tional organisations. This case is first exemplary of 
the diversity of types of confinement—and of actors 
such as guerrilla and army that are causing it. Second, 
it also shows ideal-typically the role of politics in  
determining and differentiating humanitarian needs.
30 \  This strategy can be analysed as a form of liquid warfare (Mutschler, 
2016) and relates to thoughts on ungoverned spaces (Schetter, 2012).
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support is largely denied to those affected due to a 
political assessment of the situation as a largely 
private issue.
Catatumbo is an example of the phenomenon of 
comunidades confinadas in rural areas. Persons who live 
in such isolated communities are under the control 
of armed groups. As mentioned, until a few years ago, 
groups such as the FARC, ELN and AUC (Autodefensas 
Unidas de Colombia) officially claimed to substitute 
the state. In these cases, they ‘facilitated’ (limited) 
access to health, tried to organise education and even 
improvised prisons—in other words, they provided a 
certain amount of security and order within the areas 
they occupied. Today, the focus is mostly on controlling 
transport routes, the entry and exit of persons, goods 
and information. With the de-politicisation men-
tioned above, the situation for those affected has de 
facto worsened (Cobb, 2019; OCHA, 2019b; Rojas Her-
nandez, 2018; Valenzuela, 2019). 
The situation deteriorated because armed groups, 
paradoxically, continue to determine access to educa-
tion, health or documents—even though they are no 
longer attempting to provide any services. These are 
significant limitations on movement and restrictions 
of access (see Figure 2). Between 2016 and 2018, accord-
ing to OCHA (2019b, p. 15) and government (UMAIC) 
monitoring 3,979,825 people were affected by the 
restriction on access and mobility during 517 different 
occasions. The discrepancy between this and the 
above-mentioned number of 20,500 persons counted 
officially as completely confined (see Figure 1) under-
lines the need to scrutinise differences in degrees of 
confinement and immobility more in-depth (see below).
Restrictions on access and mobility
The right to property, personal security and human 
rights are severely restricted in the communities that 
are counted as confined—yet also for a much wider 
range of persons who live in zones that are claimed 
by armed actors. In municipalities in the province of 
Humanitarian needs, national politics, military 
activities and the Peace Treaty cannot be analysed 
separately as a human rights defender from the re-
gion pointed out:
We dreamt of peace, but here we do not see it anywhere. 
In a region of 300,000 inhabitants, we have currently 
over 12,000 soldiers [in 2019]. But their presence 
does not help. We see people threatened, murdered 
and displaced on a daily basis. The situation has not 
improved—it has worsened. Our dream of peace has 
turned into a nightmare. Every day there are confron-
tations. There are minefields. The FARC has taken 
up their arms again and returned to their old bases 
[in the area]. The situation is very complex, but it is 
a historical debt. There is no willingness of the gov-
ernment: The streets are broken, the schools are in no 
good shape, there is only one doctor for every 12,000 
inhabitants. We can move, but when we leave our 
homes, we never know whether we will see our families 
back in the evening (interview Cucuta, October 2017; 
follow up telephone interview October 2019). 
The government insist that its operations are 
only against criminal groups, denies human rights 
violations, and sweeps human rights violations by 
the military under the carpet (CODHES, 2018; de Cur-
rea-Lugo, 2018; Kirby, Shannon, 2018; Munoz, 2015; 
ROZEMA, 2008; Sanchez Gomez et al., 2015; Sanchez, 
2019; Segura & Mechoulan, 2017; Semana, 2019c; Vargas 
& Caruso, 2014).
Interpreting situations such as the one in Cata- 
tumbo as exclusively a problem of combating criminal 
gangs has two interrelated consequences: a) the lack 
of state services becomes less relevant and b) the  
resulting humanitarian emergency is overlooked. In 
other words, if analyses of violence are shifted from 
the context of structural deficits of the state into the 
sphere of individual fates, then violence becomes a 
private matter. The negative consequences of this pol-
icy of privatisation of security can be observed above 
all in the phenomena of comunidades confinadas and 
fronteras invisibles (invisible frontiers):31  Humanitarian 
 
31 \  The term invisible frontiers describes the limits of gang territories 
that are not visibly marked. Even though not visible for outsiders,  
they are often more rigid than highly secured state borders. Trespass 
is often deadly (D’Aubuisson, 2017; Restrepo, 2006).
Confined communities
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Cordoba, a former AUC centre, entire areas and large 
parts of the population south of Montería continue to 
be controlled by former paramilitaries, who now keep 
corridors free for drug trafficking. In Guaviare, former 
FARC dissidents—like those before them—often pre-
vent indigenous people from leaving the area they 
control. In Catatumbo, north of Cucuta, the inhabitants 
are restricted in their freedom of movement and  
human rights by roadblocks and acts of war by the EPL, 
bacrim and the military. In the provinces of Choco 
and Narino, many communities in the ELN's retreat 
areas are completely cut off from the outside world 
(personal observations 2017, see below). 
According to villagers who live in those areas, the 
only change they saw after the Peace Treaty was that 
the members of armed groups no longer wear uni-
forms and that it is increasingly difficult to distin-
guish which group they belong to. Since the conflict 
is not a classic military conflict, the frontlines are 
blurred. Alliances change, leadership changes, and 
even within families, it is not always clear who is 
involved in or affected by criminal activities. The line 
between guerrilla, paramilitary, criminal and civilian 
groups is anything but clear. This also applies to their 
members. Individuals might move in and out of such 
groups or even change sides. Spatially, the actors are 
networked and able (or condemned) to find similar 
conditions in other parts of the country—demobi-
lised FARC members are, for example, approached by 
criminal gangs from Medellin to work for them as 
bodyguards (interview, demobilisation camp Esper-
anza 2017). 
Those groups, like the armed groups in southern 
Choco mentioned above, benefit from a widespread 
preference for fast money, a lack of income alterna-
tives and little cohesion among the often relative 
newcomers, as a civil rights leader criticised: “The 
youths without opportunities go to the [armed] 
groups—even if their parents are against it. They 
[parents] are against it because the military sector 
just brings problems” (community leader, Primavera, 
November 2017). The community leader continues to 
Figure 2 
Persons with restrictions on access and mobility
©BICC based on OCHA, 2019b, p. 15.
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Persisting lack of protection
Staff from the Office for Social Ministry in the  
Roman Catholic Diocese Quibdo, the capital of Choco, 
explain that although there is a peace agreement, 
this is not noticeable in the region. After the demobili-
sation of the FARC, other groups took their place. "The 
armed conflict in Choco has worsened. Murders, the 
spread of anti-personnel mines and extortion have 
increased or at least not stopped" (Pastoral Social, 
Quibdo, November 2017). Social workers in Istmina 
underline this point when they explain why victims 
of violence do not want to return to their place of ori-
gin: "They miss it [the place of origin]. But none of 
the victims want to return, because the same people 
are there. The names [of the armed actors] have 
changed, nothing else" (Istmina, 28 November 2017). 
Depending on the situation in the comunidades 
confinados—that is the intensity of the confrontation 
with the military or competing groups, for example—
the armed groups decide preventively, and in case of 
doubt, against the civilian. The groups virtually regard 
these villages and their people as their private property: 
Children are forbidden to go to schools, the sick to 
access health care, private individuals to communi-
cate externally. Communities that oppose the armed 
actors are left on their own. The murder of political 
activists (lider sociales) or village leaders is frequent, 
and most cases remain unresolved. Forced recruitment 
is common. Usually, one person per family has to  
be assigned to the local armed group. As mentioned 
above, the Colombian state is present in individual 
areas, such as the centre of Quibdo or Istmina, but 
cannot sufficiently secure the transport routes  
between these urban centres. Attacks, assaults and 
intimidations are frequent. The needs for schooling, 
healthcare, legal aid and other basic services, thus,  
remain largely unmet.
explain that it is difficult to find work and secure a 
livelihood. Alternatives to criminal activities are rare: 
They closed the Pacifico mine a few years ago. We 
cannot sell our [agriculture] products. Transport is 
expensive. Nobody invests here. The government does 
not develop [infrastructure]. Storage is not possible 
and often the rice harvest cannot be dried (farmers in 
the Primavera area). 
One man points to dozens of rice bags stored under 
his neighbour's porch: “Look at how many bags she 
has. The price of rice is bad. We remain sat on the 
products. Besides, there is no mill for further process-
ing” (group discussion, November 2017, Primavera 
area). The smallholders further explain that they try 
to diversify the agricultural products and grow corn, 
plantains, fruit or yucca. 
While they lament that the government is not 
present, the absence of the central state offers nu-
merous opportunities to trade. Farmers and traders 
operate without having to worry about official papers 
or government taxes. Depending on the arrangement 
with the armed actors in control, this can be advanta-
geous. Yet, these economic advantages are accompa-
nied by insecurity and immobility: “We cannot use 
our boats upriver as we do not have any papers [nec-
essary to own or conduct a boat],” The confinement of 
those groups that are not counted among the 20,000 
persons is, thus, relative. Many make a living by 
smuggling or trading illegal substances. This also 
shows that they have opportunities inside the area to 
make a living that are not given outside (November 
2017, group interview with settlers in the San Juan 
River area). These examples illustrate that the impact 
of confinement on the everyday life of the persons af-
fected is not always linked to spatial mobility or 
immobility. 
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When, as in Cordoba, paramilitaries established a 
school within their control zone or when civilians 
could use the guerrilla medical services, the impacts 
on them were ambivalent: In both cases, the popula-
tion became even more immobilsed as better access 
to health or education also meant that they could no 
longer use its (prior) lack as a reason to leave the area. 
In Guaviare, a social worker recounted the case of a 
Nukak that showed how strongly personal, social and 
spatial relationships are restricted for people who 
live next to armed groups. The Nukak are an indige-
nous semi-nomadic group that lives in the national 
park of the same name in the Amazon region. The area 
is still a focus of guerrilla and bacrim activities. In this 
case, health reasons made it necessary for a Nukak to 
leave the area controlled by armed groups for the pro-
vincial capital. When he returned with a mobile phone 
that he had bought himself in the city, the suspicion 
of the armed group (FARC) was so great that he had 
to flee and has ever since not been able to join his 
tribe (interview Guaviare province, October 2017). 
According to the research, it was typical for the 
areas with a high concentration of armed groups 
such as Choco, Guaviare, or Meta, that large parts of 
the farmers were settlers who had arrived quite 
recently—within the last generation—and stay rela-
tively mobile. Like the farmers along the San Juan 
River, these settler communities were less tightly  
organised than, for example, established indigenous 
or farmer associations in other parts of the country 
(El Espectador, 2019). The lack of organisation on the 
political and inner-community level of these new-
comer communities is a reason why armed groups 
often encounter little resistance—yet their mobility 
lowers the impact of confinement.32  
32 \  The fact that the regions in which new settlers, indigenous groups, 
bacrim and guerilla groups are found, coincide can be interpreted as a 
case in point for the argument on historic continuity made above.
Others, especially indigenous communities, are 
less mobile and more dependent on access to their 
land. The hopelessness or needs increase according to 
the extent to which discrimination criteria such as 
ethnicity (Afro–Colombian, indigenous), gender, age, 
etc. are laid on top of each other as my observations 
and the statistics show (cf. above).33  Those cases that 
are completely excluded from any contact with the 
outside world are indigenous communities in areas 
that are considered the exclusive property of armed 
groups. Those examples show, in sum, that vulnera-
bilities and needs of confined communities converge 
while they vary significantly in how much commu-
nity members are affected. 
33 \  Communities that are better organised than most newcomer-settler 
and Afro-descendant groups, such as the peace community of San Jose 
de Apartado (Antioquia), often suffer no less from the arbitrariness  
of neighbouring armed actors. Due to the lack of support from the 
Colombian government, these mostly indigenous people are cut off 
from the outside world, just as the villages that do not resist.
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The situation in urban areas is similar. People are 
either confined in territories or networks by armed 
actors—and they are cut off aid because of the political 
assessment of the actors and the situation as an issue 
of private criminality. As mentioned above, areas 
with conditions as described above for the rural  
comunidades confinadas exist next to rather safe, resi-
dential urban areas. Without entering the so-called 
ollas [pot] and their surroundings, physical violence 
remains as invisible to the outsider as the invisible 
borderlines that define them. The strategies and prac-
tices of armed groups designed to control civilians in 
their territories are often congruent in urban and rural 
areas—despite very different forms of organisation 
and objectives: They run their dominions by way of 
protection payments, threats, murder, torture, extor-
tion, forced recruitment and confiscation. These 
everyday realities have been defining the everyday 
life of communities in urban and rural areas for  
decades. They remain constant, even if and when 
individual actors or political situations change 
(Restrepo, 2006, p. 78). Just as in their rural counter-
parts, access to education, healthcare, jurisdiction 
and other infrastructure remains largely out of reach 
for inhabitants. 
Mobility of armed violence
When the Colombian Congress debated the pro-
gressive spread of youth gangs in urban areas in 2018, 
the congressmen established that their number 
throughout Colombia was over 500 (Ruiz, 2019). These 
pandillas are the link between local and translocal 
armed groups, between the micro- and the macro- 
traffic (sale of illegal substances) of the products they 
base their trade on. Bacrim and other armed groups 
finance themselves through all kinds of illegal activi-
ties and the youth gangs serve as their henchmen. 
The armed groups control—often being tolerated or 
in cooperation with state authorities—cultivation 
and retreat areas, transport routes and markets. 
Those who are inside such networks, be it because 
they support, tolerate or oppose these activities, 
therefore see limited options to evade them. To 
escape a real threat, it is, therefore, as mentioned, 
not enough to change residence within a short 
distance or to move from the countryside to the city 
or vice versa.34  Rural and urban situations largely 
overlap regarding the exposure to armed violence—
and displacement thus does not necessarily offer 
protection.
“In Cali, they would not have been safe—it is too 
close to Buenaventura”, respondents explained the 
departure of relatives to Ecuador (interviews Cali, 
November 2017).35  In other words, the circumstances 
someone flees from—due to justified fear, for exam-
ple—catch up with the individual who pursues this 
strategy, and the violence follows the displaced  
persons to or expects them at their destination. 
This could be the general level of violence described 
in the introductory case from Potrero, Cali or it 
could be a specific risk where someone cannot  
escape a threat against his person as an individual. 
To complicate things, this means that immobility 
can also refer to a state of immobility of people in 
regard to social space. Differentiation of the degrees 
of immobilisation, thus, reveals that it is necessary 
to name the lack of protection or of human rights 
as the reason why it is problematic. This lack of 
rights is independent of spatial movement: Armed 
violence and threats are mobile and persist in situ-
ations of immobilisation as well as displacement or 
transit.  
 
34 \  Many displaced persons can, therefore, be found in distant parts of 
the country or on the other side of the border in Venezuela or Ecuador 
(cf. Schmitz-Pranghe, 2018).
35 \  Respondents in Santa Fe de Antioquia or San Carlos recounted the 
same for Medellin. Some added that even Bogota and Cali were still 
too close and that “people would know you”. Others, namely dispos-
sessed farmers in the department Bolivar, did not report such prob-
lems. They believed that they were not exposed to any security risk 
even in nearby towns—as long as they did not go back or lay any 
claims on their lands. Those, however, who did return or filed for 
restitution of their former lands explained that they are still afraid 
today (Carmen de Bolivar, May 2017).
Invisible borders of immobility 
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In contrast to voluntary migration, involuntary 
immobilisation—just as other consequences of hu-
manitarian emergencies such as forced displacement, 
dispossession or expulsion—are always characterised 
by a lack of a choice. Lack of choice, involuntariness 
and the resulting lack of perspective are in fact the 
very characteristics that define and determine a  
humanitarian emergency situation. They do not arise 
from a voluntary quest for improvement, but from  
coercion.38  Coercion, in turn, appears in various degrees. 
The people in Catatumbo, for example, cannot escape 
from the control of the armed groups by fleeing to a 
nearby hill. The population can only escape acute 
military attacks for a short time by spatial movement 
of limited range. In this respect, they do not differ, for 
example, from people in war zones who find limited 
safety in churches, cellars or bunkers at short notice. 
They cannot move their belongings or livelihoods. 
This means that the degree of emergency, again, 
needs to be assessed with regard to needs and losses 
and not to movements. 
Another decisive factor for the level of needs is 
the way of life of those affected. Migrant workers, no-
mads and peripatetic groups (non-pastoralist nomads) 
lose their livelihood through spatial immobilisation. 
Farmers who have no access to land or traders who 
have no access to the market also lose their livelihood. 
The gradations are as varied as the ways of life. The 
examples make it clear that immobilisation can lead 
to the same loss of access to social, economic and po-
litical mobility as forced displacement. If, for example, 
a home is destroyed or the residents have to leave the 
house because pandillas use the house as a transport 
hub, warehouse, shelter or checkpoint, the need for 
protection is affected differently. In other words, a 
need for protection exists in a variety of cases that 
are disguised and only recognisable by scrutinising 
the level of coercion involved. 
38 \  The moment of voluntariness, which analytically distinguishes mi-
gration from forced displacement is, however, subjective on the actor 
level. Moments of coercion and choice moreover cannot always be 
clearly distinguished from each other. Even in situations that from the 
outside appear to have no alternative, the actors still have choices that 
must be included in the analysis.
Immobilisation as coercion 
A look at the cases where individuals are able to 
move in geographical space but do not manage to 
cross (invisible) borders of social networks shows 
that they are confined in emergency situations even 
though they are able to move. The introductory case 
from Primavera, Choco, of Felix illustrates how any 
assessment of situations of vulnerability must also 
take the fact into account that needs might not nec-
essarily cease to exist just because of physical dis-
tance to a hotspot of armed violence, for instance,  
or because time has passed since a violent incident 
occurred:36  Vulnerabilities and needs recur—and 
have to be responded to—in different locations. Aid, 
therefore, needs to be designed in a longer-term and 
more holistic fashion that follows the needs and the 
people in need.
The degrees of immobilisation range from vio-
lence or threats to less immediately life-threatening 
yet no less vital issues like denied access to infra-
structure and affect individuals in different ways. 
While some people in Primavera explained to be 
stuck, others were obviously able to walk away from 
the situation: “There were 80 families here, 30 left. 
Further down, only 20 of 70 families remained” (farm-
er, San Juan River area, November 2017). An analysis 
of immobility in situations of emergency must also 
distinguish between the ability, desire and need to 
move37— in contrast to general migration research, 
which examines “multiple constraints on opportuni-
ties for mobility” (Black & Collyer, 2014, p. 293). Emer-
gency situations are characterised by high follow-up 
costs for personal rights, security and possessions. 
36 \  Cf. Black and Collyer’s analysis of being “Trapped on the move” (2014, 
pp. 287–305).
37 \  Beyond the causes that force people to flee, the focus is thus directed 
to avoidance and coping strategies. Just as the inhabitants of Catatumbo 
observe the armed battles from a safe distance from a hill, farmers in 
today's Romania (for instance in Rasnov) once built so-called peasant 
fortresses on nearby hills to escape the numerous raids. In contrast to 
the inhabitants of Catatumbo, the peasants of the Middle Ages were 
free to retreat to these fortified villages with their belongings. Both 
cases illustrate different degrees of voluntariness, restrictions and 
losses during escape which is discussed in the social-anthropological 
literature on avoidance/ evasion (see Eckert, 2004).
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In Cordoba and Guaviare, development actors 
such as the GIZ have also extended the range of their 
activities to humanitarian work to meet the needs 
for schooling, healthcare, legal aid and basic services 
in confined communities. In San Jose de Guaviare, for 
example, they provided training for government staff 
and organised workshops to facilitate dialogue be-
tween the government and the Nukak to improve 
their humanitarian emergency situation. They also 
facilitated dialogue between other indigenous com-
munities and local authorities and stepped in with 
support wherever these authorities failed to provide 
basic services. In the case of Cordoba, humanitarian 
needs for the confined communities could only be 
met by the GIZ because as a development actor, their 
programmes did not officially address those humani-
tarian needs. The official goal of the projects was to 
improve access to livelihood activities for the local 
youth. They thus framed the issue not as one stem-
ming from confinement, but rather as one of regional 
underdevelopment. This way, they were permitted 
access by armed groups in control of the area because 
these could save face. Humanitarian actors were 
denied access because this was irreconcilable with 
the armed groups’ narrative (observations May 2017).
The humanitarian–development nexus 
in practice 
The work of humanitarian and development  
actors, where these can access confined communities, 
illustrates existing needs, risks and ways in which 
the nexus is already being put into practice. On the 
one hand, humanitarian programmes have picked up 
on development needs. In Potrero, a group of women 
who are taking part in a start-up programme for 
small businesses offered by the Red Cross are happy 
about the opportunity offered to them although tra-
ditionally, the Red Cross is a humanitarian actor that 
would not engage in such programmes. A seamstress 
explained that her turnover has multiplied since 
then. She explains: “Since I started writing it down, 
it's easier to control [the income and expenses]. I was 
able to buy a sewing machine”. Yet this benefit also 
incurs risks. To become a beneficiary of the pro-
gramme, individuals have to register as victims, but 
many are afraid to denounce the perpetrators. One 
explained: "I did not file my case until I saw that it 
was no longer possible [to live without assistance]. I 
was very afraid”. 
The fear of revenge actions stems from personal 
experiences, as she goes on to explain: 
They kill people and you know why. They decapitated 
many with chainsaws. I dreamt about it and had to 
see a psychologist. They cut people into pieces. I saw 
it—and I remember. A lot of things happened here 
(Cali, May 2017). 
One of the reasons why the implementation of 
laws for reparation and reconciliation remains  
difficult is related to the fact that victims have been 
experiencing for years how perpetrators are de facto 
immune to persecution and that the personal risk for 
witnesses is high.39  This case demonstrates how a 
humanitarian actor can secure access to confined 
communities and provide much-needed support 
which is normally reserved for developmental actors. 
39 \  The discrimination of those who report a crime is another reason 
why few complaints are filed. Victims (victimas) and perpetrators (victi-
marios) are often equated, and people often distance themselves from 
them. The opinion that the victims are to be blamed for criminal acts 
is widespread and reflected in the phrase "dar papaya"—which means 
as much as giving someone an opportunity to take advantage of you or 
abuse you.
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In an area where impunity, threats, indictment 
and corruption prevail, the need for protection 
against violence and threats is rarely acknowledged—
it is literally suicidal to denounce the perpetrator, as 
is shown in the number of murdered human rights 
activists (France24, 2018; KienyKe, 2018) and also re-
ported on an individual level. Colombia's example on 
the impact of criminal violence on forced migration 
or return shows that neither figures on those who 
flee nor on threats or acts of violence are sufficient 
indicators of the need for protection.42  If they are pre-
vented from fleeing, as in confined communities, still, 
they have the same need for protection as in cases 
where they have managed to flee. The need for protec-
tion might de facto be higher than that of displaced 
persons because they cannot escape.
The case studies, in sum, show that the conditions 
that make refugee and IDP movement a humanitarian 
emergency also apply to persons who are denied this 
strategy of avoidance. From a humanitarian point of 
view, the needs of displaced persons including those 
suffering forced immobility must be considered, ana-
lysed and answered.43  The usual practice of determin-
ing needs for assistance depending on difficulties of  
access or the delayed presence of humanitarian actors 
solely by the characteristic of ex-post displacement 
has decisive disadvantages. This procedure cannot 
ensure that a need for assistance is always identified. 
In this case, aid is only used when it is requested, that 
is when those affected are caught by the radar of the 
aid organisations, for instance when they appear  
beyond international borders, outside inaccessible 
zones or in reception camps. 
42 \  As long as the causes of forced migration persist, the return process 
is fragmented. According to our observations, displaced persons return 
only sporadically, or temporarily or partially (San Carlos, Santa Fe,  
Carmen de Bolivar, May 2017). Reasons for this are not only the lack of 
guarantees for personal security, but also questions such as trauma, 
reconciliation, coming to terms with what happened, continued dis-
crimination, or failure to return land. This means that even where an 
individual returned, it is not guaranteed that all conditions for  
voluntary return are met (see above).
43 \  So far, as Black and Collyer, among others, criticise, the neediness of 
this group (like that of the IDPs) in comparison to refugees is rarely 
considered "[They] are rarely acknowledged or ever addressed" (2014,  
p. 287).
The cases presented here make clear that devel-
opment and humanitarian analyses of the extent and 
consequences of escape and expulsion must take the 
political context into account and make it their own 
subject.40  In each individual case, it can be seen that 
the state, interested parties and humanitarian organ-
isations always pursue their own interests first. This 
leads to a politicisation of the question under what 
circumstances a person qualifies as eligible for aid, as 
without a humanitarian emergency, there is no aid. 
This is anything but an innovative finding—the cru-
cial point is to find a control mechanism for this 
practice. First, both humanitarian and development 
actors should revise their indicators for determining 
the need for assistance in emergencies of displace-
ment by including confined communities. Second, 
the humanitarian–development nexus policy can be 
used to assure that the efficiency of assessing and ad-
dressing needs is cross- and double-checked to avoid 
gaps. 
Determining needs for assistance
The presented empirical case “The Peace Treaty 
in Colombia” shows effects that are diametrically  
opposed to the population's need for protection. 
While the security situation (attacks, assaults, collateral 
damage caused by military actions) in urban and  
rural areas in the centre of the country tended to  
improve, the situation has deteriorated in many  
peripheral communities. A subsequent development  
towards more peace cannot be observed. On the 
contrary, the consolidation and continued coexist-
ence of both a constitutional state on the one hand 
and one outside the rule of law on the other41  is a  
reality in Colombia even despite the 2016 Peace Treaty 
(Piccone, 2019). 
40 \  Including practice, mandate and legal definition of humanitarian 
aid—whether by the United Nations, national governments or other 
political or legal institutions—as a moment of analysis rather than a 
binding criterion for analysis (see above).
41 \  Rule of law is to be distinguished from lawless insofar as that rules 
also prevail in such areas. This ranges from an ad hoc law of the 
strongest in pandilla groups to the parastatal jurisdiction of the FARC.
Conclusion: Transcending traditional divisions
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humanitarian and development aid often overlap 
and in a variety of cases already complement each 
other. The edge that development aid has over humani-
tarian aid is the ability to engage in preventive and 
longer-term projects. Instead of bolstering the main-
stream activities of humanitarian actors, synergies 
arise where development aid redefines the area of  
humanitarian needs in regard to its objectives and 
instruments. 
This Paper illustrated this point by examining 
one area that traditional refugee aid does not address: 
Persons who are forcibly immobilised show similar 
characteristics, have similar needs and need similar 
support as IDPs or refugees, even though they are not 
spatially displaced. One particular need is that of pro-
tection. It has been demonstrated that the omittance 
of forced immobility and consequential exclusionary 
practices are partly due to the political economy of 
the refugee regime. This static conceptualisation of 
crises, as the Colombian case shows, cannot adequately 
address the needs arising from confinement, restricted 
mobility and displacement. The argument of this  
Paper, thus, is to replace the classical concept of spatial 
displacement with a model of displacement that in-
cludes both in situ immobilised persons (on the spot) 
and ex situ immobilised persons (immobilised after 
initial movement in space). 
The described cases indicated two seemingly  
contradictory phenomena: On the one hand, dis-
placement is just a variation of every citizen’s right to 
protection. Legal scholars, for example, argue that the 
Guiding Principles for internal displacement do not 
entitle IDPs to any (extra) rights that would differ 
from the human rights they already possess as citizens 
(Hathaway, 2007, p. 359). On the other hand, the cases 
demonstrate that there is a range of commonalities 
across situations usually associated with forced dis-
placement. The case of confined communities illus-
trates how specific constellations of armed conflict, 
combined with a lack of access to protection result in 
particular emergencies that stretch across different 
categories such as refugees, IDPs, or forcibly immobi-
lised persons. 
Practising the humanitarian–development 
nexus
Due to its longer-time commitment, I suggest 
that development aid is in a better position to prevent 
emergencies and to consolidate resilience than  
humanitarian aid, simply because the latter will only 
arrive after the emergency has occurred. It is also  
better positioned to respond in a more holistic way to 
people’s needs, whereby it should proactively seek to 
extend short-term humanitarian relief for groups 
currently left out. To this end, more comprehensive 
studies are needed first which, along with other 
themes, includes the need for better qualitative infor-
mation on the situation of trapped communities 
(Black & Collyer, 2014, p. 300). In a number of cases  
observed in Colombia, humanitarian and develop-
ment aid actors had identified the same needs. To 
provide the necessary support, they stretched their 
respective mandates and crossed their respective tra-
ditional project boundaries: Development aid actors 
such as the GIZ already engage—sometimes as the 
only actor in place—in humanitarian projects with 
confined communities and people with restricted 
movement in Cordoba, Guaviare and Catatumbo (see 
above). The International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) as a classical humanitarian actor pioneered 
into a traditional field of development aid by setting 
up quite a successful programme to advise, train,  
promote and supervise victims as qualified workers, 
for instance in Cali (see above).
Reflecting on how to put the humanitarian– 
development nexus into practice, actors paid most  
attention to camp populations in protracted refugee 
situations (PRS). The need to improve (indeed to over-
come) the situation of refugees in camps and settle-
ments remains fundamental, but development aid 
could maximise synergy potentials by focusing on 
those impacts of armed conflict that are not yet  
addressed by humanitarian aid sufficiently. The cases 
of urban and rural confined communities in areas 
such as Choco, Cali and Catatumbo show first that 
more attention needs to be paid to such humanitarian 
emergencies that are out of sight, and second that 
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This means first, that most measures (including 
procedures, tools, staff expertise) used to address dis-
placed persons could easily and successfully be trans-
ferred to immobilised persons respectively persons 
with restricted mobility. Extending programmes  
designed to address basic services such as health,  
education, infrastructure, housing, land and property 
or legal aid issues after displacement to situations of 
confined and restricted communities would only  
require minor to no modifications. A needs-based 
approach (Rudolf, 2019b) would indeed not require 
any changes in displacement aid at all. Existing  
resources could thereby be used efficiently. A humani-
tarian–development nexus policy would, also, respond 
“more effectively and holistically to people’s needs” 
(Fanning & Fullwood-Thomas, 2019, p. 6), if it starts 
with the humanitarian principle to uphold human 
dignity to then proceed to situations of displacement 
and dispossession, and to then address more specific 
needs—rather than doing it the other way round.
The Colombian case, finally, demonstrates that 
this is possible. As is evident in (cited) reports, projects 
and advocacy work of national respectively interna-
tional NGOs and government bodies like the defensoria, 
Colombia’s aid community, is addressing the problems 
described above—and ahead of headquarters, donors 
and policymakers. The practitioners on the ground 
are increasingly cooperating as envisioned in the  
humanitarian–development nexus policy and engag-
ing in innovative projects that transcend their respec-
tive traditional mandates. The challenge aid projects 
are facing in dealing with these type of situations are 
rather related to the concepts that reign in their 
headquarters respectively their governments. 
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AGC Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia  AGC
AUC  Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia  AUC 
BICC  Bonn International Center for Conversion BICC
BMZ German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development BMZ
CCN  Comision de Conciliacion Nacional CCN 
CRRF  Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework CRRF 
DP Displaced person IDP
ELN  Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional ELN 
EPL Ejercito Popular de Liberacion EPL
FARC  Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia FARC 
GCR  Global Compact on Refugees GCR 
GIZ Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit GIZ
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross ICRC
IDMC  Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre IDMC 
IDP Internally displaced person IDP
IRR Impoverishment Risk and Reconstruction Model IRR
JEP Jurisdiccion Especial para la Paz JEP
MSF Medecins Sans Frontieres MSF
NGO Non-government organisation NGO
OCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OCHA
PDS Protracted displacement situation PDS
PRS Protraced refugee situation PRS
UARIV Unidad para la Atencion y la Reparacion Integral a las Victimas UARIV
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
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